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Does political sophistication matter for economic voting? Does 
citizens‘ economic voting behavior vary according to their level of 
political sophistication? Some scholars (Campbell et al. 1960; Fiorina 
1981; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Gomez and Wilson 2001, 2003) 
argue that political sophistication affects political behavior including 
economic voting. Certainly, the level of political sophistication varies 
across voters: cognitive heterogeneity in the electorate (Delli Carpini 
and Keeter 1996). However, how political sophistication influences 
economic voting is controversial. One of the purposes of this research 
note is to examine the competing arguments regarding the question: 
Does political sophistication condition economic voting? 
Economic voting is one of the most studied subjects in voting 
behavior (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2011). The basic idea of the 
economic voting theory is that voters vote for candidates according to 
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their economic evaluations (Lewis-Beck 1988; MacKuen, Erikson, and 
Stimson 1992). Simply speaking, citizens who positively evaluate 
economic conditions are more likely to vote for incumbent 
candidates/parties. If voters think that economic conditions are bad or 
worse, they tend to vote for challengers. While voting, some citizens 
focus on national economic conditions (sociotropic voting), and others 
rely on their evaluations of personal economic conditions 
(pocketbook/egocentric voting).
Political scientists argue that cognitive heterogeneity in the 
electorate matters for economic voting, but how cognitive 
heterogeneity affects economic voting is controversial. Some (e.g., 
Fiorina 1981; Mutz 1992; Krause 1997) argue that the less politically 
sophisticated tend to vote for candidates according to their 
pocketbook conditions while the more politically sophisticated vote 
for candidates according to their evaluations of the national economy. 
However, Gomez and Wilson (2001, 2003) insist that the more 
sophisticated vote their pocketbook conditions while the less 
sophisticated vote national economic conditions.
The contradictory arguments have not been rigorously tested even 
though they are important to understanding voting behavior in 
democracy. Unlike previous studies that generally divide voters into 
different groups according to the level of political knowledge and 
separately estimate the effects of economic evaluations on vote 
choice, this study utilizes interaction models and estimate the 
conditional effects of political sophistication on economic voting. 
From the results of this study, we can grasp the influence of political 
knowledge on political behavior more comprehensively
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Does cognitive heterogeneity matter for economic voting? If 
cognitive heterogeneity influences economic voting, how does political 
sophistication condition economic voting? Do the effects of 
sociotropic and pocketbook economic evaluations on vote choice vary 
according to the level of political sophistication? This study aims to 
address the questions and reveal the relationship between political 
sophistication and economic voting. Estimating the conditional effects 
of political sophistication on sociotropic and pocketbook voting, this 
study examines the competing arguments. The following section 
introduces the competing arguments in detail.
Political Sophistication and Economic Voting
Political scientists (e.g., Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Zaller 1992; 
Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) indicate that political sophistication is 
a significant variable explaining politics. Certainly, political 
sophistication varies across individuals. Some are politically more 
knowledgeable than others. For instance, the more educated tend to 
show higher political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996).1) 
As Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996, 1) state, scholars have believed 
that “democracy functions best when its citizens are politically 
informed” because citizens directly and indirectly participate in policy 
making in democracy. Politically knowledgeable citizens can elect 
better representatives who can make better policies. 
1) What explains political sophistication is an interesting and important topic. 
However, this study focuses on whether or not political sophistication affects 
political behavior: economic voting. 
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Beyond the normative argument, Zaller (1992) contends that 
political knowledge affects political behavior. For instance, politically 
sophisticated individuals are less likely to be affected by incoming 
information because they tend to have stronger predispositions even 
though they generally receive more political information. Druckman 
and Nelson (2003), on the contrary, show that politically 
knowledgeable citizens are more likely to be “framed” by incoming 
information because political sophisticates better can facilitate 
incoming frames. According to previous empirical studies (e.g., 
Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Zaller 1992; Druckman and Nelson 2003), 
how political sophistication influences political behavior is somewhat 
controversial. 
Debates around the effects of political sophistication on political 
behavior are also observed in economic voting. Scholars (e.g, Fiorina 
1981; Gomez and Wilson 2001) are interested in whether or not 
political sophistication influences sociotropic and pocketbook economic 
voting. As mentioned previously, economic voting is related to 
attributing responsibility for economic conditions to (incumbent) 
candidates (democratic accountability). For instance, sociotropic voters 
reward or punish incumbent candidates according to their evaluations 
of the national economy. In theory, sociotropic voters tend to think 
that government is responsible for national economic conditions. 
Stressing government responsibility for the national economy implies 
that government policies affect national economic conditions. 
Certainly, incumbent candidates are responsible for government 
policies (at least in part).2) Thus, sociotropic voting is based on the 
assumption that voters connect national economic conditions to 
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government policies (Gomez and Wilson 2001). 
Sociotropic voting requires of voters at least two conditions. In 
order to reward or punish incumbent candidates according to their 
evaluations of national economic conditions, first, citizens need to 
grasp current/past economic conditions. Second, voters should be able 
to understand how incumbent candidates or their policies affected 
national economic conditions. Political sophistication can influence 
these two conditions. 
Some scholars (e.g., Fiorina 1981; Mutz 1992; Delli Carpini and 
Keeter 1996; Goren 1997) argue that sociotropic voting is prominent 
among the politically sophisticated. According to them, politically 
sophisticated voters understand the fact that government policies are 
designed for the national economy rather than citizens’ personal 
economic conditions. In other words, even though the national 
economy is prosperous, some individuals’ economic conditions can be 
unfortunate. Also, political sophisticates generally better understand 
how government policies affect the national economy.
The politically less sophisticated, in contrast, tend to vote for 
candidates according to their pocketbook conditions. Politically less 
sophisticated voters generally do not understand the connections 
between government policies and national economic conditions. 
(And?) they are generally ignorant about national economic conditions 
2) It is important to note that the clarity of government responsibility positively 
affects economic voting (Powell and Whitten 1993). For instance, if one party 
holds both the executive and legislative branches in presidential systems, it may 
be less controversial that incumbent presidential candidates are more responsible 
for policy failures/successes compared to incumbent presidential candidates under 
divided governments. 
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compared to political sophisticates. Hence, politically less 
sophisticated voters tend to use their pocketbook conditions as an 
information shortcut to evaluate the national economy. For instance, 
when their pocketbook conditions are bad, they tend to regard that 
national economic conditions are also bad like theirs.
Unlike the conventional arguments, however, Gomez and Wilson 
(2001, 2003) insist that political sophisticates tend to vote for 
candidates according to their pocketbook conditions while the less 
sophisticated are more likely to vote for candidates according to their 
evaluations of national economic conditions. According to Gomez and 
Wilson (2001, 2003), pocketbook voting requires more political 
information/knowledge than sociotropic voting. 
Connecting government policies to national economic conditions, 
sociotropic voters reward or punish incumbent candidates. Likewise, 
according to Gomez and Wilson (2001), pocketbook voting requires 
connecting government policies to personal economic conditions 
(rather than just using pocketbook conditions as an information 
shortcut). Certainly, government policies can affect personal economic 
conditions. Government policies influence national economic 
conditions, which in turn can affect personal economic conditions. In 
order to vote for candidates according to their personal economic 
conditions, voters need to understand both of the connections between 
economic policies and national economic conditions and between 
national economic conditions and personal economic conditions. 
According to the conventional argument that political sophisticates 
vote the national economy, sociotropic voting requires a certain level 
of political and economic knowledge/information. However, Kinder 
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and Kiewiet (1981) argue that sociotropic voting does not necessarily 
require citizens to be well informed about national political and 
economic conditions. In particular, during election campaigns, 
information about national economic conditions is nearly ubiquitous. 
Voters relatively easily obtain information about national economic 
conditions from various sources such as mass media. Furthermore, 
candidates frequently debate about economic policies and national 
economic conditions. That is, it is relatively straightforward for voters 
to link national economic conditions to government policies during 
election campaigns.
Gomez and Wilson (2001, 2003) test their arguments that 
pocketbook voting is significantly observed among the politically 
knowledgeable while the politically less knowledgeable tend to vote 
for candidates according to their evaluations of national economic 
conditions. Gomez and Wilson (2001, 2003) classify voters into 
different groups according to the level of their political knowledge 
and analyze their vote choice in the 1992 and 1996 presidential 
elections to test the hypotheses. Their regression results generally 
support the arguments. 
Godbout and Bélanger (2007), however, criticize that Gomez and 
Wilson’s studies have some flaws. In theory, they contend that even 
the politically less sophisticated can link government economic 
policies to their personal economic conditions. If the less 
sophisticated can understand the relationships between government 
policies and macro economic conditions, they also can associate their 
personal economic situations with national economic conditions. 
In methodology, Godbout and Bélanger (2007) criticize that their 
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findings are not valid when incumbent presidents are not running for 
reelection. Also, they criticize that measuring vote choice as an 
intention is problematic. Instead of measuring vote choice as a voting 
intention, they measure vote choice as a reported vote by utilizing 
the post-election survey questions in the American National Election 
Studies (ANES). 
Godbout and Bélanger’s (2007) criticisms are informative. However, 
some of the criticisms are invalid. In particular, their methodological 
criticisms are controversial. Economic voting is basically about 
attributing responsibility for economic conditions to incumbent 
candidates. Hence, if current presidents are not running for reelection, 
it may be difficult to observe economic voting itself because of the 
clarity of government responsibility (Powell and Whitten 1993). 
Measuring vote choice by utilizing post-election questions is also 
controversial. Previous studies (e.g., Wright 1990; Atkeson 1999; 
Burden 2000) generally reveal that survey respondents tend to 
over-report their choice: supporting winners. Hence, instead of 
post-election survey items, pre-election survey items are used more 
widely to measure vote choice since Campbell et al. (1960). 
Beyond the debates, this research indicates that both Gomez and 
Wilson (2001) and Godbout and Bélanger (2007) apply an 
inappropriate method to test their arguments. They divide survey 
respondents into four groups according to the level of political 
knowledge. Then, they separately estimate and compare the effects of 
economic evaluations on vote choice from the four groups. This 
approach is inappropriate for estimating conditional effects. Rather, 
using interaction models is a proper way of examining conditional 
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effects (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2005). 
If we divide observations into different groups according to a 
conditional variable and estimate the effects of independent variables, 
it theoretically means that all independent variables are interacted 
with the conditional variable. Certainly, the estimates are likely to be 
biased. Unlike prior research (Gomez and Wilson 2001, 2003; 
Godbout and Bélanger 2007), this study examines the conditional 
effects of political sophistication on economic voting by utilizing 
interaction models. The following section details the methods and 
variables this study utilizes.
Study Design
To test the theories introduced in the previous section, this study 
analyzes individual vote choice in the 1992, 1996, and 2004 U.S. 
presidential elections. The ANES data are used for regression 
analyses. According to the regression results in this study, voters’ 
evaluations of economic conditions significantly explain individual 
vote choice in the three elections. Except the latest election,3) the 
elections are the most recent elections that incumbent presidents 
(George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush) ran for 
reelection. 
3) The ANES data for the 2012 presidential election are not yet available. 
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Variables and Data
The dependent variable of this research is individual vote choice. 
Vote choice is treated as a dichotomous variable because economic 
voting is about attributing economic failure/success to government. 
That is, if respondents intend to vote for incumbent candidates, this 
intention is coded as 1. On the other hand, if respondents intend to 
vote for challengers, it is coded as 0. This study measures vote 
intention as vote choice, which is included in the pre-election surveys 
of the ANES.4) 
According to the economic voting theory, citizens tend to vote for 
candidates according to their economic evaluations. Hence, voters’ 
evaluations of economic conditions are the main independent variables 
in this research. Specifically, in pocketbook voting, the independent 
variable is voters’ evaluations of personal economic conditions. In 
sociotropic voting, the independent variable is voters’ evaluations of 
national economic conditions. 
This study measures economic evaluations as retrospection, not 
prospection because economic voting is theoretically about 
government accountability.5) The ANES surveys ask respondents to 
evaluate changes in the national economy and their personal 
4) As mentioned previously, survey respondents tend to over-report their vote 
choice in post-election surveys (Wright 1990; Atkeson 1999; Burden 2000). 
Hence, this study analyzes the pre-election vote choice items in the ANES.
5) Prospective evaluations may be important and useful in particular to study 
presidential support/popularity (MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992). However, 
studying vote choice by utilizing survey data, it is difficult to differentiate 
between the effects of prospective evaluations on vote choice and voters’ 
projection. 
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economic conditions retrospectively. The ANES classifies the 
evaluations into five categories, and this study codes them orderly: 
much better = 4, somewhat better = 3, about the same = 2, 
somewhat worse = 1, much worse = 0. According to the economic 
voting theory, the economic evaluation variables are positively 
associated with the dependent variable: voting for incumbent 
candidates.
In the cognitive heterogeneity theory, political sophistication is a 
conditional variable influencing economic voting. To measure political 
sophistication, this study counts correct answers to the questions 
about political facts in the ANES surveys. This measure of political 
knowledge is widely used and supported by scholars as a proper 
indicator to measure political sophistication (Zaller 1992; Jacoby 
1995; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1993; Gomez and Wilson 2001; 
Godbout and Bélanger 2007). 
The 1992 ANES survey includes six questions about identifying 
political figures and two questions about answering the majority party 
in Senate and the House. In the 1996 ANES survey, thirteen 
questions are selected to measure political sophistication. Four 
questions are identifying political figures, two questions are recalling 
the names of candidates who run for the House of Representatives, 
two questions are answering the majority party in Senate and the 
House, and four questions are identifying major news network 
anchors’ names. In the 2004 ANES survey, this study selects six 
questions to measure political sophistication: four questions about 
identifying political figures and two questions about answering the 
majority party in Senate and the House. Political sophistication is 
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coded as the number of correct answers. Hence, higher values in this 
variable mean better political knowledge.
Even though citizens tend to vote for candidates according to their 
evaluations of economic conditions, economic voting is not the only 
theory that explains individual vote choice. Voters often cast ballots 
according to their policy preferences: issue/policy voting (Page and 
Brody 1972; Lewis and King 1999). Hence, this study controls the 
effects of voters’ policy preferences on vote choice.
In order to consider issue voting, this study measures the distances 
between voters’ issue positions and incumbent candidates’ issue 
positions perceived by voters.6) According to the issue voting theory, 
voters will vote for the candidate who shares the most similar issue 
preferences with them. In this study, three issues (social spending, 
defense spending, and racial issue) are selected. According to the 
issue voting theory, the distance is negatively related to the 
dependent variable (Enelow and Hinich 1984). If voters perceive that 
incumbent candidates’ issue positions are away from their issue 
positions compared to challengers’ issue positions, they are less likely 
to vote for incumbent candidates. 
The ANES surveys include questions about social and welfare 
spending in 1992, 1996, and 2004. The ANES asks respondents about 
their issue positions (range from 1 to 7) and candidates’ issue 
6) Unlike the conventional argument of issue voting, Rabinowitz and MacDonald 
(1989) maintain that direction matters rather than proximity when citizens 
consider issues to vote. However, Lewis and King (1999) show that it is very 
difficult to verify the direction and proximity models in issue voting with 
statistical methods and empirical data. This study follows the conventional 
manner of testing issue voting. 
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positions (range from 1 to 7). The issue position distance variable is 
calculated by measuring the difference in the absolute distances 
between voters’ issue positions and their perceptions of incumbent 
candidates’ issue positions and between voters’ issue positions and 
their perceptions of major challengers’ issue positions.7) As the 
difference increases, voters are less likely to vote for incumbent 
candidates. 
Respondents’ racial attitudes and their perceptions of candidates’ 
racial attitudes are included in the 1996 and 2004 ANES. However, 
in 1992 the ANES does not include questions about respondents’ 
perceptions of candidates’ racial attitudes. Hence, in the 1992 
election, the racial attitude variable means respondents’ attitudes 
toward racial issues. In this variable, larger values mean more 
conservative attitudes (agree with the statement that blacks should 
help themselves). 
Besides the variables, this study includes partisan, socioeconomic, 
and demographic variables in the following models. They are voters’ 
partisanship, ideology, education, income, gender, age, race, and 
region. Partisanship and ideology are measured by utilizing the 7 
point scale summary items in the ANES (0=strong 
Republican/conservative to 7=strong Democrat/liberal). The education 
variable ranges from 0 (8th grade or lower) to 6 (advanced degree). 
Income is measured by using the family income questions in the 
ANES. Age is measured as year. Gender, race, and region are coded 
as a dichotomous variable (male = 1, female = 0. whites = 1, 
7) Issue Position Difference = |Voter’s Position - Incumbent Candidate’s Position| - 
|Voter’s Position - Challenger’s Position|
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otherwise = 0. the south = 1, otherwise = 0). 
Models and Methods
The dependent variable is individual vote choice in this study. 
Because this variable is dichotomous (1=vote for incumbent 
candidates, 0=vote for challengers), the Probit model is used to test 
the cognitive heterogeneity theory. The cognitive heterogeneity theory 
is that political sophistication conditions the effects of economic 
evaluations on the probability of voting for incumbent candidates. To 
examine the conditional effects of political sophistication, this study 
applies interaction models. A baseline model is introduced below:
 
    
 
 
   
This model does not include any interaction variables. This model 
will show whether or not economic voting is present in the three 
elections. The following model is to estimate the conditional effects 
of political sophistication on economic voting. 
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  





In this model the economic evaluation (“Socio” and “Pocket”) 
variables are interacted with the political knowledge (PK) variable. 
From these interactions, we can observe whether or not political 
sophistication conditions economic voting. If it conditions, the results 
also will illustrate how political sophistication influences sociotropic 
and pocketbook economic voting. 
As Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2005) point out, interaction effects 
are difficult to comprehend only by reading regression coefficients. 
Even though interaction terms are statistically insignificant, for 
instance, it does not necessarily mean that there is no conditional 
effect. For instance, we can assume a simple Probit model: 
           ∙




′ ∙       ′′ ∙.
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If the interaction term () is zero, the interaction effect will be 

′′ ∙. In other words, even though the interaction term is not 
statistically significant, it does not necessarily mean that conditional 
effects are equal to zero or statistically insignificant. As Brambor, 
Clark, and Golder (2005) suggest, this study uses statistical 
simulations to examine the conditional effects.8) Since regression 
coefficients from the Probit model do not have substantial meanings, 
this study presents marginal effects from the Probit regression. The 
following section introduces the regression and simulation results. 
Statistical Results
Table 1 contains the Probit regression results based on the baseline 
model. The table presents marginal effects and standard errors in 
parentheses. Also, the table shows the probability changes in the 
dependent variable (voting for incumbent candidates) from the minimum 
values to the maximum values of the independent variables.9) 
According to the results in Table 1, voters’ sociotropic economic 
evaluations significantly explain their vote choice in the 1992, 1996, 
and 2004 presidential elections. For instance, if other conditions are 
equal and a voter changes his/her evaluations of the national 
economy from “Much Worse” to “Much Better” in the 1992 election, 
his/her probability of voting for George H.W. Bush increases about 
8) In simulations, the control variables are set at their means. For more information 
about simulations, please see Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2005). 
9) The other variables’ values are set at their means. 
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Variables
1992 1996 2004

















































































































30 percent. The effects of voters’ evaluations of the national 
economy are even larger in the 1996 and 2004 elections. The sizes 
of the “Min-Max” effects are .51 and .46 in 1996 and 2004. The 
results are generally consistent with prior economic voting studies 
(e.g., Gomez and Wilson 2001; Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2011).
Table 1. Economic Voting in the 1992, 1996, and 2004 Presidential Elections
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Variables
1992 1996 2004




























N 1032 939 519
Pseudo R2 .53 .61 .72





Note: The number in the table are marginal effects and standard errors (in 
parentheses). Statistical significance: ** < .05, * < .10. 
Unlike the sociotropic variable, the pocketbook variable shows 
inconsistent results across the three elections in Table 1. In the 1992 
presidential election, voters’ pocketbook evaluations significantly affect 
their vote choice. If a voter changes his/her evaluations of personal 
economic conditions from the lowest to the highest, his/her 
probability of voting for the incumbent candidate increases about 18 
percent in the 1992 election. However, voters’ evaluations of their 
pocketbook conditions do not significantly explain their vote choice 
in the 1996 and 2004 presidential elections. Prior research (e.g., 
Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992) 
also shows that the U.S. citizens do not vote personal economic 
conditions in general.10) 
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Since Campbell et al. (1960), party identification is considered as 
one of the most important variables explaining individual vote choice 
in the U.S. Expectedly, the party identification variable shows 
statistical significance. The probability changes by switching 
partisanship are dramatic in all three elections. For instance, the 
probability of voting for George W. Bush increases about 87 percent 
if one switches his/her party identification from “Strong Democrat” to 
“Strong Republican” (and vice versa) in the 2004 election. Alongside 
with partisan voting, ideological voting is also observed in the three 
elections. 
Issue variables except the defense spending variable generally 
significantly explain the dependent variable.11) As the distances 
between voters’ issue positions and incumbent candidates’ issue 
positions relatively become wider, the probability of voting for 
incumbent candidates tends to decrease in all three elections. 
The results in Table 1 show that the baseline model is comparable 
with prior economic voting literature (e.g., Lewis-Beck and Paldam 
2000; Gomez and Wilson 2001; Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2011). 
Based on this model, the cognitive heterogeneity model is tested, and 
the test results are introduced in the following section.
10) In the 1992 election, the economy was a hot-button issue. The Clinton camp 
primed the issue of the economy including pocketbook conditions, which was 
successful eventually according to the election results and the results in Table 1. 
According to prior research (e.g., Hetherington 1996), voters seemed to 
underestimate national economic conditions in the 1992 election, which also 
contributed to Bush’s failure. 
11) Note that in the 1992 election, the racial issue variable is only based on 
respondents’ attitudes toward racial issues because of lack of data. 











































































Does political knowledge condition economic voting? If it does, 
how does political knowledge condition economic voting? Table 2, 
Figure 1, and Figure 2 offer some answers to the questions. Table 2 
contains the Probit regression results from the cognitive heterogeneity 
model. Major control variables show statistical significance and 
expected signs in Table 2, which are quite comparable with the 
results in Table 1. 
Table 2. Economic Voting and Political Sophistication 





















































N 1032 939 473
Pseudo R2 .53 .61 .73
Log-Likelihood -303.78 -249.35 -86.83
% of Reduction in Error 62.53 76.02 83.47
Note: The number in the table are marginal effects and standard errors 
(in parentheses). Statistical significance: ** < .05, * < .10. 
In Table 2 the interaction variables do not show statistical 
significance. However, as explained in the previous section, it does 
not necessarily mean that there is no conditional effect of political 
knowledge on economic voting. According to statistical studies 
(Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2005; Ai and Norton 2003), conditional 
effects from interaction models can be better examined by utilizing 
graphical methods. This study uses statistical simulations to examine 
the conditional effects of political knowledge on socitoropic and 
pocketbook voting (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2005). Figure 1 and 
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Figure 1. Political Knowledge and Sociotropic Voting
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Figure 1 shows how political knowledge conditions the effects of 
sociotropic evaluations on vote choice. The figure contains three 
panels. The top, middle, and bottom panels illustrate the conditional 
effects of political knowledge on sociotropic voting in the 1992, 
1996, and 2004 elections. In each panel, the X axis represents the 
level of political knowledge, and the Y axis denotes the marginal 
effects of sociotropic economic evaluations on vote choice. The solid 
line in each panel illustrates changes in the marginal effects, and the 
dashed lines represent the 95 percent confidence interval of the 
effects.12) 
According to the results of Figure 1, the marginal effects of 
sociotropic evaluations change as the level of political knowledge 
increases, and the effects are statistically significant in general. 
However, the directions of the conditional effects are inconsistent 
across the three elections. In the 1996 and 2004 elections, the 
marginal effects of sociotropic evaluations on vote choice tend to 
increase as the level of political knowledge increases. The effects are 
statistically significant overall. That is, voters tend to rely more on 
their sociotropic evaluations as their political knowledge increases. 
However, in the 1992 election, the effects tend to decrease as 
political knowledge increases. 
12) The dashed lines are curved. This is partially because more observations are 
located in the middle level of political knowledge. 
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Figure 2. Political Knowledge and Pocketbook Voting
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The simulation results in the top panel support Gomez and 
Wilson’s argument (2001, 2003) that political knowledge negatively 
conditions sociotropic voting. However, according to the middle and 
bottom panels, political knowledge positively conditions sociotropic 
voting, which is comparable with the conventional argument that 
sociotropic voting is more prominent among political sophisticates 
(e.g., Fiorina 1981; Mutz 1992; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; 
Goren 1997). In sum, it is difficult to assert how political knowledge 
conditions sociotropic voting even though it is certain that political 
knowledge influences the effects of sociotropic evaluations on vote 
choice. 
While Figure 1 portrays the relationship between political 
knowledge and sociotropic voting, Figure 2 illustrates how political 
knowledge conditions pocketbook voting. Figure 2 does not provide a 
clear picture of the relationship between pocketbook voting and 
political knowledge. The directions of conditional effects of political 
knowledge on pocketbook voting are inconsistent across the three 
elections, and the effects are generally insignificant.
In the 1992 election (the top panel), the marginal effects of 
pocketbook evaluations on vote choice increase as the level of 
political knowledge increases. The effects are significant in general. 
The results in this panel support Gomez and Wilson’s argument 
(2003, 2007) that the politically knowledgeable tend to vote for 
candidates according to their evaluations of personal economic 
conditions. The pattern is also observed in the 1996 election. 
However, the effects are not statistically significant in 1996. 
In contrast to the top and middle panels, the bottom panel shows 
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that political knowledge negatively conditions pocketbook voting. 
Conventionally, scholars (e.g., Fiorina 1981; Mutz 1992; Delli Carpini 
and Keeter 1996; Goren 1997) speculate that the politically less 
sophisticated are more likely to vote for candidates according to their 
personal economic conditions. However, like the middle panel, the 
effects are not statistically significant in the bottom panel. 
The middle and bottom panels show that the effects of egocentric 
evaluations are statistically insignificant. That is, political knowledge 
is not a significant variable explaining pocketbook voting. This may 
be caused by the fact that pocketbook voting is not significantly 
observed in the 1996 and 2004 elections. Note the fact that 
pocketbook evaluations significantly influence vote choice in the 1992 
election.13) In sum, it is difficult to assert that political knowledge 
significantly conditions pocketbook voting. Furthermore, according to 
the results in Figure 1 and Figure 2, political knowledge is not a 
consistent variable that influences economic voting.
Conclusion
One of the main purposes of this research note is to examine 
whether or not political sophistication conditions economic voting. 
Unlike previous studies (e.g., Gomez and Wilson 2001, 2003; 
Godbout and Bélanger 2007), this study examines competing 
arguments around the effects of political sophistication on economic 
13) Also, note that sociotropic voting is observed in all three elections, and political 
knowledge conditions socitotropic voting in the elections. 
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voting by utilizing interaction models and statistical simulations.
Conventionally, scholars (e.g., Fiorina 1981; Delli Carpini and 
Keeter 1996) argue that political sophisticates tend to vote for 
candidates according to their evaluations of the national economy. In 
contrast, the politically less sophisticated are more likely to rely on 
their pocketbook evaluations when they vote for candidates. However, 
Gomez and Wilson (2001, 2003) contend that political sophisticates 
vote pocketbook conditions while the politically less sophisticated 
vote for candidates according to their evaluations of the national 
economy. To examine the competing arguments, this study analyzes 
individual vote choice in the 1992, 1996, and 2004 U.S. presidential 
elections.
The empirical results in this study are mixed. Regarding sociotropic 
voting, political knowledge generally significantly conditions the 
effects of sociotropic economic evaluations on vote choice. As their 
level of political knowledge increases, voters tend to rely more on 
their evaluations of national economic conditions in the 1996 and 
2004. However, the opposite pattern is observed in the 1992 election. 
That is, voters tend to rely more on their sociotropic evaluations as 
their level of political knowledge decreases in the 1992 election.
The inconsistent results are more prominent in pocketbook voting. 
Only in the 1992 election, political knowledge significantly conditions 
pocketbook voting. In this election, political sophisticates tend to vote 
for candidates according to their personal economic conditions. 
However, in the 1996 and 2004 elections, political knowledge does 
not significantly affect pocketbook voting. Also, the directions of the 
effects vary across the three elections. 
222   Han Soo Lee
In sum, the empirical results in this study illustrate that political 
knowledge significantly conditions sociotropic voting. However, how 
political sophistication conditions sociotropic voting is not entirely 
clear. Regarding pocketbook voting, the conditional effects of political 
sophistication on vote choice are more controversial. According to the 
results, political sophistication is not a stable variable explaining 
economic voting. If political sophistication is not a stable variable 
explaining the variation, there may be other stable variables that 
explain the variation. The next step of this study will be searching 
the variables that explain the variation in economic voting.
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Abstract
 
Cognitive Heterogeneity and Economic Voting: 
Does Political Sophistication Condition 
Economic Voting?
Han  S oo Lee
(Seoul National University)
This research examines the influence of political sophistication on 
economic voting. Whether or not political sophistication affects economic 
voting is controversial. Empirical studies show mixed evidence regarding the 
topic. This study points out that methodological approaches in previous 
empirical studies could cause the mixed results. By analyzing data from the 
1992, 1996, and 2008 presidential elections in the United States with 
interaction models, this study reveals that political sophistication conditions 
sociotropic economic voting. However, the conditional effects vary across the 
three elections. In contrast, political sophistication does not condition 
pocketbook voting in general. 
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